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The Application of the Criteria 
of the Just War Theories 
in the Resolution of 
Medical-Ethical Dilemmas 
at the Bedside 
by 
Ms. Anne B. Baker 
This paper was originally written for a class taken with J Bryan Hehir on The 
Just War Theories, at Harvard Divinity School, Spring semester, 1993. 
In an age of technology gone awry there is a desperate need for moral, 
philosophical, and ethical reasoning to play "catch-up" in the arena of practical 
application. This was a problem in 1945 at the dawn of the Nuclear Age and is a 
problem now in the early childhood years of the medical technological age. 
Here, we propose to address the need for a means to make basic ethical 
decisions as a part of routine medical care. Applied ethics seeks not only to 
answer the question "what is the just1 thing to do?" It also directs its effort toward 
making choices in actual cases. We will introduce a process for decision-making 
which provides the tools for the practitioner and the patient to use veryday, in 
every circumstance. The process has to be able to stand the tests of 
universibilizability, that is it must be useful in all areas of medicine and 
generalizability, that is it must be applicable to all like situations by all people in 
the same way. Which ever method of ethical reasoning is used, for instance in an 
emergency room in Boston must also be usable in a neonatal ward in Houston. 
The usefulness of the method of ethical reasoning must work regardless of the 
people, places, or circumstances involved. 
In the United States the method must also find acceptance in a pluralistic 
society. It must be open to all philosophical and religious calculation. We can not 
impose a singular view on people who would find it repugnant or morally 
reprehensible. At the same time we must provide a framework in which we ask, 
"What is the just thing to do?" "The moral challenge of pluralism is the search for 
a consensus broad enough to provide moral coherence, but narrow enough to 
protect religious liberty."2 There should be no forseen exclusion of people from 
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any religious or ethnic group in the application of this method of ethical 
reasoning. For instance, the pacifists of politics would be consistent with the 
Christian Scientists of medicine. 
The purpose of this article is to introduce a formulaic process, framework, 
algorithm if you will, for making ethical decisions in actual medical cases. The 
formula has a 1500 year tradition. It has demonstrated a comprehensive 
inclusion of the ethical considerations presented by the dilemmas at hand. It has 
also been adaptable enough to stand the tests of time and place. Evidence for the 
proclivity for comprehensive, adaptable tools for decision-making and 
subsequent action in medical practice, can be seen in the widespread use of the 
Glasgow Coma Score in head injury, the Apgar Score for the immediate 
evaluation of newborns, the ABCs of the basic rescue, and the American Heart 
Association's algorithms for advanced cardiac life support, to name a few. These 
allow health care providers to be on common ground with common standards in 
the field, clinic, or hospital whether they are in Boston or Los Angeles. 
At this time, there appears to be no standardization of ethical reasoning 
routinely used in medicine. Many decisions are made using the processes 
physicians learned during internships and residences. In spite of their good 
intentions, these were not taught by people who were trained primarily in 
pbilosophy or ethics. There is an increasing need for a straightforward method for 
bioethical decision-making. This requires no graphs, no charts, no conversion 
equations. In a phrase, we need "adaptable simplicity." Terribly complex 
solutions can't be applied in urgent situations. 
One of the pitfalls of the non-standardized method of good intention, is the 
problem of making medical judgments based on moral sentiment and not on a 
fixed formulaic process of comprehensive questioning, such as we present here. 
"As ethicists, we must, in tum, give the highest priority to careful reconsideration 
of the limits and functions of various modes of moral discourse in different 
contexts, lest we be left to the capricious whim or definition of , right' as the will of 
the strongest."3 
In this article we will demonstrate the use of the criteria of the just-war 
theories, primarily as defined by James Childress.4 In his work, Childress bases 
the historical granting of permission to take up arms, on the conflict between the 
prima facie duty5 to do no harm, and the duties to restore peace and to protect the 
innocent which override it.6 
It cannot be stressed too often or too strongly that the criteria must be used as a 
group. Not to consider them as a unit would be tantamount to starting an LV. and 
not connecting anything to it, or taking an X-ray without using film, or 
performing surgery and not closing the incision. There are many things in 
medicine which must be done completely. This is one of them! 
It may at first seem incongruous to even consider the use of the criteria of the 
just-war theories to make treatment or care decisions in medicine. However, a 
close look at the development and purpose of these criteria will provide a 
plausible connection to modem medicine. 
In modern medicine we start with the prima facie duty to do no harm. As we 
move from that duty as an idea to the duty as a bedside practice, we equip 
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ourselves with the stuff of modern medicine. Our modalities of treatment include: 
testing, such as "lab work" and imaging; treatment with drugs, therapies and 
surgical intervention; nursing care with human and technical monitoring; and the 
advanced technologies of modernity: dialysis, artificial ventilation, anesthesia, 
and feeding tubes, among others. 
As we glance through this familiar list we see two things. First, as in war, they 
all do harm. Harm in the form of pain, restriction, invasion and exposure. We 
need to remember this. To stick people with needles to obtain blood samples or 
or to administer therapy hurts! To take an X-ray is to expose the patient to 
potentially deadly radiation. To make a proper diagnosis or to monitor patients, 
we frequently obtain information that people would prefer no one know about 
them, and yet we invade privacy. 
Secondly, in both war and medicine we must seek an exemption to our duty to 
do no harm. For deciding if we can be granted an exemption to the prima facie 
duty to do no harm the criteria of the just-war theories are very helpful. The use of 
these criteria do not necessarily lead to just one conclusion for a specific treatment 
plan. Think for a moment of the good people found on both sides of the Gulf War 
debate or the invasion of Bosnia debate. For this reason, the agent or agents 
seeking an exemption from doing no harm must strive to develop as virtuous 
agent in order to reach the most satisfactory decisions possible. 
When the Hippocratic Oath was penned it could not have been imagined that 
serious debate about over-treating would arise and continue for decades. In the 
United States today health care providers constantly face the task of making 
decisions about what constitutes the ethical treatment of people entrusted to their 
care. Never before in medical history have so many been so confused by a myriad 
of choices set before them by the creators of medical technology. 
Every day, every minute, choices for drug therapy alone represent thousands 
of hours of decision-making effort As the complexity of patients' medical 
problems rise, the options for tech"ological interventions rise exponentially. 
Considering the ethics of the means we use for care, no longer is the simple 
question of yesterday, i.e. ordinary v. extraordinary means, entirely adequate to 
resolve bioethical dilemmas. We now must ask: "Which of the extraordinary 
choices set before me, as a health care provider, should I or may I offer as 
treatment to the patient at hand?" The questions posed by old means of treatment 
are complicated by questions of autonomy, cost, futility, experimental treatments 
and the rapid introduction of new technologies. 
The Childress model of the just-war theories uses eight criteria. They are: 
legitimate authority, just cause, reasonable hope for success, just intention, due 
proportion, just means, declaration, and last resort.1 Arthur Dyck considers these 
criteria to demonstrate ethical decision-making in the decision to perform an 
appendectomy. The purpose of, or cause for, the surgery is to prevent the death of 
the patient. The intention is the well-being of the patient. The operation must be 
performed on the one who has appendicitis, accurately diagnosed as such. The 
risk of death from untreated appendicitis is very high. The risk from surgery is 
small; the chance of success is very high. There is no alternative treatment, given 
the condition of the appendix of the patient and given existing knowledge. 
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Informed written consent is obtained within a hospital setting. The operation is 
performed by a credentialled doctor, experienced as a surgeon, or supervised by 
one who is.8 
In this article we will formalize and expand the process. We will set forth an 
alogrithm of eight criteria. All eight criteria must be considered to make the 
formulaic process viable. In our opinion, all the areas of concern in bioethical 
decision-making are given consideration. This process differs from other ways to 
make ethical decisions because it is comprehensive, rather than focusing on just 
one criterion such as: the benefit/burden proportion, rules, consequences, 
emotional sentiment or utility as the only consideration. 
We recognize that no idea is complete when first thought. We wish to solicit 
comments and constructive criticism from our colleagues in both medicine and 
ethics. This will surely lead to improvements not only in the use of this method 
but, more importantly, it will benefit the patient to whom we dedicate our lives of 
service and care. Finally, it is our hope that this method of reasoning will be one 
of the methods used as we move ethical theory into ethical practice. 
N ow we will discuss the criteria. We will present the historical context first and 
then demonstrate the appropriate application in bioethics. Finally we will present 
an actual case in which this formulaic process was used. 
Legitimate Authority 
Who decides? 
The purpose of this first criterion is to identify what party or parties are 
primarily responsible for making the decision to move forward. It is this party 
who is "primarily responsible for judging whether the other criteria are met."9 
Determining right or legitimate authority in civil or political matters, varies with 
the type of government in power. In general a government which can: maintain 
order within its state and protect its borders is a legitimate government. In a 
democracy a very important addition is that the consent of the governed is 
necessary to legitimate government action and power because "the citizen is ruler 
as well as subject." 10 In the United States the duly elected Congress represents the 
will of the people to work in conjunction with the President in the decision to 
take up arms and go to war. 
The legitimate authority not only decides whether or not to intervene but also 
how to have the combatants conduct themselves during war. During the conflict 
the individual has a moral right (although not a legal right) not to participate in 
activities he or she finds morally unjust. lI 
The legitimate authority in medicine is analogous to the model of the 
legitimate authority in government. The physician and the patient constitute the 
legitimate authority in medicine as the duly elected officials and the electorate 
constitute the legitimate in politics. There are few exceptions to the rule of the 
patient as autonomous in medicine.12 Physicians are vested with legitimate 
authority for a number of reasons. They have been educated in credentialled 
schools of medicine; had supervised medical experience; received licensure from 
their government; practice in credentialled facilities; have been accredited and 
credentialled, in their area of expertise, by various professional medical boards; 
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and assent to the ancient, sacred physician/patient covenant. Some physicians 
have been burdened by the full weight of decision-making for some of their 
patients. Although the physician is the leader of the health care team and has 
considerable authority for making the diagnosis and for developing the treatment 
plan, the patient must also take part in the decision-making process. The patient's 
ability to make an informed decision about which therapeutic course to freely 
elect to follow, depends greatly on the skill of the physician and the health care 
team to present accurate diagnoses and treatment options. 
Since the dilemma of the case of Karen Ann Quinlanl3 the government has 
become increasingly involved in the issue of legitimate authority in medical 
decision-making. Rare is the week during which there is no report in the secular 
press of bioethical decision-making reaching the courts. Interestingly, in 1957 
Pius XII stated "The rights and duties of the doctor are correlative to those of the 
patient. The doctor, in fact, has no separate or independent right where the 
patient is concerned. In general he (sic) can take action only if the patient 
explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly, gives him (sic) permission."14 
However, because the legitimate authority of the physician is correlative to that 
of the patient, the authority of the physician is strictly bound to his or her own 
conscience. As a result, if the physician finds the health care wishes or plans of the 
patient to be medically and/or morally untenable or outside the scope of his or 
her expertise or the expertise ofthe facility, the physician may find it necessary to 
transfer the patient to another service and/ or facility. Concomitantly, the patient 
has this same right. 
With the enactment of the Health Care Proxy Law in 1990, the weight of 
decision-making responsibility has expanded from the patient, when able to 
speak competently, to the inclusion of proxy declarations of the patient's wishes 
when incompetence is established. IS Several legal cases in Massachusetts have 
been precedent-setting in the area of patient autonomy. Their implications for 
legitimate authority are useful to remember. The adult patient (and emancipated 
minor) has the right to refuse medical interventionl6 if he or she is competent, 
which is presumedl7 unless proven otherwise and it is considered assault l8 to treat 
him or her without proper informed consent. This is based on the right to privacy 
against interference with bodily integrity.19 Exercise oflegitimate authority and 
its expressed need for not only a credentialled and competent care provider, but 
also for informed consent, is not necessarily an easy task. 
The patient in medicine, as the congress and the people in politics, have the 
obligation to actively engage in the process of informed consent in the face of 
intervention. It is the duty of the credentialled and experienced physician to make 
an accurate diagnosis, develop a reasonable care plan and to find the language 
which will be adequate to allow the patient to make a reasonable decision about 
care. Informed consent does not necessarily happen all at once. It should start 
during routine care when the caregiver and the patient engage in conversation 
about the patient's goals and values for living. The patient cannot be left to his or 
her own devices in highly stressed situations to sort out dilemmas. Autonomy 
does not leave the patient in a vacuum.20 
Once the legitimate authority criterion is met it will be an ongoing factor in 
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. the decision-making process. It may even occur that the patient and the 
practitioner need to separate because of irreconcilable differences in the care 
plan. 
Just Cause 
For what reason do we seek to intervene? Is it just? 
In the political arena we may seek an exemption to the prima/ade duty to do 
no harm and to take up arms "if a serious and weighty reason exists"21 to do so. 
There are classic reasons. First, to protect the innocent from unjust attack by 
using the least amount of force necessary to stop the aggressor. Second, to restore 
rights wrongfully denied. Finally, to re-establish just order.22 
Just cause for medical intervention can follow the same thinking as that in 
war. Understanding it is important for several reasons. In the model for care in 
Western medicine the Hippocratic Oath states, "I will follow that system of 
regime which, according to my ability and judgments, I consider for the benefit 
of my patient." Secondly, the first tenet of medicine Primum non nocere (first do 
no harm) alerts us to the need to examine, the reason(s) for which we seek to 
intervene in the life of another. We need a just reason. Also, competing with 
claims of good health and well-being, a disruptive interference with bodily 
integrity must be serious and weighty. 
Based on this assumption, we must examine what constitutes ajust cause for 
doing harm to a patient. Let us remember at this point that unintentional harm is, 
in fact, being done when we: stick people with needles to obtain samples for 
examination or to administer therapy. Harm is being done when we expose 
people to radiation for diagnostic or therapeutic reasons. Harm is being done 
when we save lives with cardiopulmonary resuscitation, surgery and give 
medications, among other things. 
We must remember that the weight of the claim of the patient to be treated 
and cared for needs to be considered in the light of the cause for intervention. 
Therefore we must refrain from intervening unless we can satisfy the claim that 
we seek to help the patient to live in such a way that his or her values and 
integrity are protected. To do this it is reasonable to defend the patient against 
their own body parts which threaten life and well-being through unjust 
aggression of agents such as pathogens; failed organs; pain too terrible to bear; 
injury or mental anguish. Further, we can recover something wrongfully taken, 
such as the patient's good health. We can eliminate evil, as in removing a tumor, 
to prevent future or further damage to the patient. These are just causes for 
inflicting the least amount of unintentional harm in the form of medical 
treatment in the care of another person. 
In this criterion we are asking only if there is just cause to harm people, even 
slightly, in our effort to help them maintain well-being or restore good health. 
We ask, what is the reason to intervene for this patient, at this time, under these 
circumstances? Is it just? 
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Probability For Success 
What will be the predictable outcome? Is it reasonable to assume that we will 
achieve ajust peace if we take up arms? This criterion is based on the reasonable 
(not absolute) hope for achieving peace through the taking upof arms in war. It is 
derived from the prohibition against suicide.23 We also need to be aware of the 
deleterious effects of war on the spirit ofthe people and the possibility of having a 
military success at the cost of a national disaster. 24 The American Bishops are 
succinct about the purpose of this criterion "to prevent irrational resort to force 
or hopeless resistance when the outcome will clearly be disproportionate or 
futile."25 Here is the clear point at which we apply this criterion to the practice of 
medicine. 
Reasonable hope for success is established through the just cause and the right 
intention, using just means and being based on the telos of the patient and 
reasonable medical standards. In light of this, there are four questions to consider 
as we proceed. First, can we/must we use every available technology, on every 
patient, without consideration of the possibility of the end point of this treatment 
to be futile?26 
Second, is there a likelihood that the patient will be returned to a reasonable 
state of well-being? Third, what are the qualities oflife that the patient is enjoying 
before the intervention? Are they what the patient finds to be acceptable? 
Finally, how does the patient define success? 
As far as the use of technology is concerned, we are on the horns of a dilemma. 
However, defining our purpose in the just cause criterion, will help determine 
which, if any, technology we will consider using. A problem arises from the 
public demand for a cure for everything. We see it in the demand for the use and 
misuse of technology on the one hand and the fear people have of being enslaved 
to technology on the other. There is great need for extensive public discourse on 
the meaning of success vis a vis global medical outcomes. 
One of our most visible dilemmas in the use of the success criterion is the Do 
Not Resuscitate Order (DNR). Looking at the rationale for the DNR is helpful 
in making determinations for other interventions. Resuscitation should not be 
initiated if there is no demonstrated benefit to the patient; if there will be a poor 
quality of life after resuscitation, in the patient's opinion (for instance it would 
leave the patient permanently unconscious and he or she finds that 
unacceptable); there is a poor quality of life, in the patient's opinion, before the 
attempted resuscitation, (for instance if the patient is in end-stage organ failure or 
cancer).27 
Although the DNR is written by the physician, it prescinds from the legitimate 
authority discussed above. The order signifies that the patient has refused a 
procedure.28 Of course in the case of real uncertainty, good medicine errs on the 
side of life. If it is found that a patient has been resuscitated who did not want to 
be, treatment can be withdrawn with the same legal, ethical and moral certainty 
as it can be forgone. . 
Consider here that futility is dependent on the intended end of our treatment 
and on the telos of the patient. For these reasons futility is sometimes an illusive 
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notion. We need to discuss the futility of care with patients as part of an 
evolutionary care plan. A good clinical description offutile care is that it will fail 
in clinical terms or that it will work but won't postpone death for even a few 
minutes.29 
Success, futility and qualities of life are all considered first in light of the 
patient's most deeply held proclivities and inhibitions. As we stated earlier, the 
rights of the physician and the health care team are correlative to those of the 
patient. The inclinations of the health care providers, family and community 
should be considered in decision making along with those of the patient and the 
physician. However the physician, as the team leader and medical expert and the 
patient, as a moral agent are the most important decision makers. 
Just Intention 
What do I reasonably hope to achieve by this intervention? Why am I doing 
this? Is it in keeping with good medical practice and the telos of the patient? Do I 
seek first to do no harm? 
Just intention is to achieve the just cause or goal by using just means. The just 
cause in war is peace. Childress considers the just intention of both the decision to 
take up arms and of the conduct of those who justly bear arms. Thejust intention 
of and in war focuses on the just cause of peace as the object, end or telos ofwar.30 
It is in the consideration of just intention that we examine the motive for our 
actions. If we seek good health and life as a particular, precious member of a 
sacred group, must we or can we sometimes do some harm to achieve an equal or 
greater good? The right intention also means "avoiding unnecessarily destructive 
acts or imposing unreasonable conditions" during the course of war.3l 
Our intent in medicine is first to do no harm and second to restore the patient 
to the best health and well-being that he or she can reasonably expect. This 
includes helping the patient to live as fully as possible in community. Our 
intention can not stand alone in the process of moral evaluation. Right intention, 
just means, and due proportion are inextricably linked in the ethic we are 
describing. What we say we intend must be verifiable by the means we use and by 
the proportion of foreseeable harm done to the good achieved. It is very difficult 
to ascertain the interiority of the intent of others and sometimes even ourselves. 
Nevertheless, the outcome of the action is verifiable and must be considered and 
accounted for in order for right or just intention to be met. Therefore we ask: "Do 
the means I have chosen verify the intent I have stated for this choice of 
treatment?" 
Problems can arise when we are routinely confronted with ways to help 
patients that are harmful in some measure. They may be painful, costly, 
inconvenient or burdensome for the patient. We need to take care not to employ 
means that are unnecessarily destructive or impose unreasonable demands on the 
patient in his or her opinion. Frequently, the principal of double effect has been 
employed in the consideration of the intent of medical intervention.32 
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Due Proportion 
What is the balance between the true, overall harm done and the good 
reasonably hoped for? Is the anticipated good equal to or greater than the 
expected harm? 
When taking up arms, due proportion is considered in the granting of an 
exception to the prima facie duty to do no harm. Balancing the good and evil 
effects in war is uncertain because the total infliction of harm must be considered 
and this is of course very difficult.33 In war the cost of lives of troops and 
noncombatants, from all causes as well as the financial drain and destruction of 
resources needs to be accounted for and balanced before intervening. The 
probable good is balanced with the foreseeable harm in both the political and 
medical application of this criterion. 
Again, we consider the need to inflict some harm with sharp objects, 
medications, and invasion of privacy, among others. In considering proportion 
we can not be frozen in inaction, rather we assess the benefit/burden ratio. An 
example of the need to consider benefit/burden ratios can readily be seen in 
therapy requiring punctures. Have we escalated a therapy's burden with multiple 
sticks when an indwelling catheter might be placed early in the intervention? 
One is not required to use extraordinary means to save one's life. These means 
have been referred to as disproportionate means in recent years. The 
benefit/ burden ratio is considered first from the patient's perspective. The 
questions explored are: is the intervention too painful, too costly, too 
inconvenient or too great a burden in light of the expected outcome? The 
physician has two responsibilities here. First to advocate for the patient and 
second to consider the true, overall cost of this intervention. We ask, "Is this 
treatment the right fit for this patient, at this time"? 
"There is no such thing as free care. Somebody always ends up paying for it."34 
This is a reminder of the financial cost of treatment which, more and more is 
considered in the proportionality of benefit to burden. We are frequently 
challenged by the allocation of scarce resources. In this area the balance is 
between the needs of this patient as a member of the community as a whole. 
However, the allocation of scarce resources can not be confused with rationing or 
intentional shorting of medical goods and services to the significant detriment of 
the patients. 
What is the true, overall cost of our intervention? Will we do more harm than 
good when we intervene in a particular way? 
Just Means 
Is the intervention which I propose, going to give each his or her due? The act 
can be either an act or omission.35 Is the act or omission a good or indifferent act? 
Not to act is, of course, active medical intervention. 
To grant an exception to the duty not to harm, the means used in the conduct 
of war is considered. This includes not only a limit to the kinds of weapons used 
but also places limits on the conduct of the combatants in conflict. That is, 
noncombatants must be protected and no more force than is necessary to stop 
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unjust aggression and restore a just peace may be employed. Further,just means 
requires good faith, respect for the humanity of the enemy, and an immediate 
object not to kill.36 The conduct of war today is especially important because of 
the overwhelming devastating potential of the weapons available to some 
nations. 
We can not go beyond the immediate goal of obtaining a just peace by using 
means with the intent merely to destroy. Just as obliteration bombing was 
condemned37 because the means employed, the intentional slaughter of the 
innocent, was unjust and out of proportion to the intent: to demoralize the spirit 
of a nation, so too, must we examine the use of modem technology, such as 
nuclear weapons and the purpose of their use in war. 
When we examine the means we must be sure that they involve good or 
indifferent acts or methods and that the intent which must also be good can verify 
the means which we use. In medicine we focus on the intent to restore good 
health and well-being while minimizing the harm done. Therefore, interventions 
must not create a new victim. That means, that 1) one intervenes on the basis of a 
legitimate, diagnosed need and 2) the patient makes an informed voluntary 
decision. These points are critical and parallel "never deliberately targeting a 
noncombatant", i.e. never targeting an "innocent" or unarmed person. 
There is no requirement to use every means available especially if they 
represent too great a burden to the patient. We often ask, "Just because we can do 
it, must we do it?" The answer is, no. We need to know if the intervention fits the 
need of this patient in these circumstances. Proportionality is considered under its 
own criterion, in order to determine if the means are in proportion to the good 
they can do. 
We must first seek to do no harm. This includes the overtreatment as well as 
the undertreatment of our patients. Will the means we propose help this patient 
to realize his or her telos?38 In a practical sense, we need to have the patient 
consider what values and meaning they find in life. If life to one patient is 
primarily physiological and metabolic, the just means considered would differ 
from those means considered by one who places emphasis on life lived in 
community. We will listen to the patient who is telling us, as well as possible, 
what means will be appropriate. This formulaic process will accomodate a wide 
variety of predilections on the part of the physician and the patient. 
In medicine we ask the following questions. Is the means good in itself? Is it too 
painful, costly, inconvenient or unlikely to succeed? Does it create an innocent 
victim of either the caregiver or the patient? Does the means fit the medical need 
to maximize the patient's health and well-being? Finally, and very importantly, 
does the means used verify the stated, just intention of the intervention? 
Declaration 
Have we discussed and made public our intention to intervene? 
This is the final stage before intervention. It is the responsibility of the parties 
seeking an exemption to the duty to do no harm to explain themselves.39 There 
are limits as well as requirements to this criterion. The truthful declaration of war 
must be stated while the details of the battle plan remain secret. In a democracy, 
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the declaration allows the governed to consent or to refuse to go to war. It allows 
for public discourse and for retreat to less violent means. 
The same prescription for disclosure and confidentiality hold true in medicine. 
The patient must supply informed consent. The importance for the criterion in 
medicine is that it allows for moral disclosure among the health care team, the 
patient, the family, and the community. Further, it allows for retreat to less drastic 
means or the foregoing of extraordinary means. Several things are considered at 
this time: informed consent, the right to privacy, public disclosure, and 
professional consultation. 
Informed consent has been discussed under legitimate authority. It overlaps 
here because it is in this criterion that the patient, having been reasonably well 
informed, either consents to the care plan or chooses a less drastic course of 
action. Informed consent is necessary because the patient, as a moral agent, must 
understand the benefit/burden ratio of the proposed care plan before consenting 
to the risks and anticipated harm to be inflicted. 
It is the duty of the one seeking to intervene, that is the health care provider, 
generally the physician, to explain and justify the care plan, and the patient to 
accept it. This is analogous to the responsibility described in political 
intervention. The health care provider is responsible to find the language which 
the patient can understand and which is not overly prejudicial in nature. 
Disclosure of sufficient information is necessary to allow the patient to reach a 
reasonable decision.40 This does not require the disclosure of all risks if the 
physician believes the patient already has some information41 , nor does it call for 
the disclosure of information which the patient could not reasonably understand. 
Truth in disclosure in medicine is crucial to the exemption to the duty to do no 
harm. It is an opportunity for the patient and the caregiver to grow in mutual trust 
and cooperation. Although it is sometimes difficult, failure to obtain informed 
consent is a failure to exercise the doctor/patient trust in good faith. This consent 
must be in writing, on the record in order to substantiate intent and to allow the 
opportunity to check for mistakes, at a later time. 
Patient confidentiality has been a concern since the time of Hippocrates. 
"What I may see or hear in the course of treatment or even outside of treatment in 
regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will 
keep to myself."42 The right to privacy is not absolute. It is generally accepted that 
patient privacy ends where public peril begins. That is why we report gunshot 
wounds, some stabbings and some communicable diseases. The Tarasoff 
Decision establishes the need for disclosure by the physician when an identifiable 
victim exists. However, the preponderence of cases will require routine 
announcement of the care plan to the patient, discussion of the care plan and 
options, the gathering of any necessary consults, and informed consent. 
In sum, the declaration criterion asks the questions: have I informed the patient 
reasonably well about his or her condition, choices of therapy, and gotten 
permission to treat in accordance with good medical practice and the patient's 
wishes? Have I maintained confidentiality and protected the public from peril; 
have I engaged in public discourse; have I gotten any necessary consults; do I 
have the patient's consent form signed and placed in the record for current and 
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future accuracy of the intent ofthe patient; and have I retreated to less invasive or 
disruptive means if indicated? 
The Last Resort 
Have I provided an evolutionary care plan? Have I tried less violent means first 
and failed to meet the just goal with them? 
In politics of war, it is the purpose of this criterion to retain the primajacie duty 
to do no harm. It starts with the efforts to avoid war. The last resort recognizes 
that it is not necessary that "all possible measures have been attempted and 
exhausted if there is no reasonable expectation that they will be successful. "43 For 
instance, if blockades and negotiations have failed after a reasonable effort has 
been made, there is no need to have false hope for them to restore just order and 
provide peace. 
The same holds true in medicine. Least drastic means (starting with 
prevention) are tried first in an evolutionary care plan. In developing a care plan 
we consider several things from the perspective of both ethics and good standards 
of medicine: have we determined the goal oftreatment with this patient; does the 
patient know that he or she can forego or withdraw a specific treatment if it seems 
or becomes too burdensome; have we used technology properly; and is this an 
evolutionary care plan? 
These considerations are all part of routine, evolutionary care plans which 
include understanding by the patient when cures are easily effected and when 
treatment plans need repeated modification and change. They require the 
acknowledgment that at some point the patient will die. An evolutionary plan 
faces both the tremendous good that medicine can accomplish and the power of 
nature over our best efforts in the end. Arthur Dyck discusses the need for ideal 
companionship in Rights and Responsibilities. 44 This should be the end, in good 
medical care when we can no longer hope for a cure. 
Technology presents a double edged sword in many ways. It has, at once, the 
potential for great good and for great harm. For instance, imaging techniques can 
confirm diagnoses but cumulative radiation can cause great harm. The jury is still 
out on the long term affects of multiple ultrasounds and magnetic resonance 
imagings. Cardiac catheterizations are much less invasive than surgery but more 
so than imaging. The point is that aggressive treatment may be necessary to save 
life but the least risky procedures should be considered before resorting to the 
more or the most risky intervention. Waiting for test results, such as HIV testing, 
and paying for some extraordinary treatments, such as transplantations or 
monoclonal antibodies, may pose a morally unacceptable burden for the patient. 
In areas where there are teaching hospitals and large tertiary facilities we tend to 
forget that some people find it too burdensome to leave their support networks to 
avail themselves of the most sophisticated medical treatment. We need to know 
what the patient's hopes and fears are in order to develop a care plan which 
minimizes burdens while maximizing realistic hope and well-being. Here we 
review previous and future treatment with the patient to insure that the least 
amount of harm will be inflicted, while insuring that we will be a faithful 
companion throughout. Ongoing treatments are evaluated for efficacy, 
14 Linacre Quarterly 
tolerability, and for futility; then necessary modifications can be made. 
Conclusion 
The use of the criteria of the just-war theories provides a comprehensive, 
simple, formulaic process and algorithm for making sound bioethical decisions at 
the bedside. 
We have demonstrated that the ethical concerns of non-maleficence, 
autonomy, disclosure, confidentiality, beneficence, justice and good medicine 
can be considered using the same criteria in the field, the office or in the hospital. 
We will remember that we need to exempt ourselves from the prima facie duty 
to do no harm each time we harm or allow harm to be done to ourselves or to 
another. In medicine we frequently need to do some harm in order to achieve a 
greater or equal good. We ask eight questions and need favorable responses to 
proceed. The questions are easily incorporated into routine decision-making. 
First: Just Cause. Do I have a just or worthy reason for this action? Second: 
Legitimate Authority. Do I have legitimate authority? Have I asked the patient 
and am I qualified, in a qualified setting, to do the task? Third: Probability of 
Success. Is there a likelihood that the intervention which I propose will advance 
the well-being and good health of this patient? Fourth: Proportionality. Is the 
intervention going to achieve equal or greater good than the harm that it will 
cause? Fifth: Declaration. Have I declared my intentions and gotten appropriate 
consults, while honoring the patient's right to privacy and safeguarding the 
public? Is the patient, reasonably well informed? Do I have written consent, if at 
all possible? Sixth: Last Resort. Is this treatment plan evolutionary? Does it 
propose a course of action that is necessary while trying to care for the patient 
with the least amount of harm inflicted? Seventh: Right Intention. Is my intention 
to help the patient realize his or her potential for well-being? Are my intentions 
precisely to achieve ajustgoal withjust means - no more and no less? Eighth: Just 
Means. Are the means which I use morally good acts, omissions and treatments? 
Are they appropriate for this patient without harming the caregiver or the 
community? 
Case Application 
Mrs. Carter presented as an awake and alert, 93 year old, white, Methodist, 
widow, reported to have been in good health, by her hursing home supervisor. 
She was admitted to the Norwood Hospital Emergency Room from a local 
nursing home, with a chief complaint of crushing chest pain. It was accompanied 
by less severe ja wand left arm pain and shortness of breath. She was cyanotic, 
cool and diaphoretic. She arrived by basic life support transport in a sitting 
position and had a non-rebreather mask for oxygen supplementation. 
When she arrived she was evaluated while having a 12 lead EKG, a portable 
chest X-ray, a 22 gauge angiocath inserted (from which blood was obtained for 
lab work) and a saline lock secured. Cardiac monitor leads were attached which 
showed elevated T-waves. The diagnosis was made of an inferior myocardial 
infarct, with congestive failure. 
Mrs. Carter was a retired nurse. She grasped the severity of her condition and 
November, 1995 15 
was very helpful in making decisions about her care with the healthcare team. 
Just Cause 
We sought to intervene because Mrs. Carter sought our aid to restore her to 
health and well-being. She wanted, most of all to be relieved of her chest pain. 
There was just cause for our intervention. 
Legitimate Authority 
In this case Mrs. Carter, a retired nurse, was conscious and alert and competent 
to make decisions about her care. Dialogue with the patient regarding her goal for 
and choices of treatment was continuous. The physician on duty was a Board 
Certified Emergency Room Physician, with 15 years experience, working in an 
accredited emergency room. 
Last Resort 
The medical intervention in the life of Catherine Carter developed as a part of 
an evolutionary care plan. The first step was to ask the patient what was wrong. 
Her chest pain and shortness of breath were treated first with supplementary 
oxygen, then with intravenous Lasix, administered through a small bore IV 
(accomplished with one stick) and from which blood was drawn for diagnostic 
tests. Dialogue with Mrs. Carter was continuous. She made it clear that she did 
not want to be intubated, have external cardiac masage (she was DNR on 
admission to the hospital) or to be treated aggressively with cardiotonic drugs. 
She wanted to be relieved of severe chest pain. 
Declaration 
Mrs. Carter understood the severity of her condition. She was offered 
Morphine with an explanation of its benefits and burdens. She chose to have 
Lasix, oxygen, and Morphine in addition to the diagnostic tests which were 
performed. 
Reasonable Hope for Success 
As we stated above, the reasonable hope is to restore the reasonable health and 
well-being of the patient in light of her telos and good medical practice. Mrs. 
Carter did not want aggressive treatment, nor would it have been good medical 
practice. The treatment she was given was consistent with what she wanted and 
with what the health care team could reasonably provide. 
Just Intention 
Our intention was just because it was to restore the patient to a state of 
reasonable health and well-being (to be free of unreasonable pain) through the 
use of good and just means. The verification of this statement is treated under the 
just means criterion. 
Due Proportion 
Here, the burden of the treatment (oxygen, EKG, cardiac monitor, portable 
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chest X-ray, #22 angiocath, Lasix, Morphine 2 mgms. IV, and human 
companionship) was in due or reasonable proportion to the pain control Mrs. 
Carter realized. 
Just Means 
The means used were consistent with good medical practice and with the 
wishes of the patient. They also verified our just intent, helping the patient to 
realize good health, to the best of our ability, in the face of Nature. To review, the 
means used were not too painful. The oxygen mask was adjusted for comfort and 
when breathing became comfortable for her a nasal prong administration set was 
used. The cardiac monitor leads and tracing were accomplished with no pain 
inflicted. A small IV was placed with one venipuncture, diagnostic blood samples 
were drawn from the same site, and medications were administered through the 
line. The portable X-ray was somewhat disruptive but in keeping with the need to 
make the diagnosis. Further, the means were not too inconvenient. Once the 
patient was in the Emergency Room, the means were all readily available. The 
cost of treatment for the patient, as well as for the thrid party payer, was low. 
Some interventions for this disease are very expensive and when those treatments 
are clinically indicated, the outcomes should be evaluated.45 Finally, the means 
were not too burdensome in light of Mrs. Carter's desire for treatment. 
Did the means verify the just intent? There were questions raised about the use 
of analgesic Morphine. The dose of 2mgms. IV, was appropriate for the age, 
weight, and condition of the patient.46 A dose of this size would not have been 
appropriate for a newborn, nor would it have verified the intent to relieve the 
pain of a 30 year old patient who had been getting 800mgms., of Morphine IV 
every hour for the prolonged pain control of bone cancer. It is an important 
feature of this method of moral reasoning to verify the means used with the stated, 
just intent. 
Mrs. Carter received pain relief from her treatment which was verified by her 
own admission and by her ability to engage in light conversation about her life as 
a nurse and wife. She was both gracious and grateful for her care. She was 
especially grateful that the health care team did not leave her unattended during 
her brief stay in the emergency room. Mrs. Carter died peacefully, holding the 
hand of her caregiver. Nature had taken its course. 
We add this true and realistic conclusion, in order not to pretend that ethical 
reasoning will provide an easy path to the practice of medicine. Rather, ethical 
reasoning will provide the caregiver the assurance that he or she made a reasoned, 
informed decision by using a comprehensive formulaic process of ethical 
reasoning. 
*1 wish to thank my advisor, Professor Arthur Dyck, for reading this manuscript, 
making helpful suggestions, and for providing the challenge necessary to 
complete this endeavor. 
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